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From: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
To: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Cc: passt-dev@passt.top
Subject: Re: [PATCH 05/10] Clarify various self-isolation steps
Date: Thu, 13 Oct 2022 04:17:05 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221013041705.31f63c5c@elisabeth> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221011054018.1449506-6-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>

I think this, in particular, is really a notable improvement. Same here,
only nits:

On Tue, 11 Oct 2022 16:40:13 +1100
David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> wrote:

> We have a number of steps of self-isolation scattered across our code.
> Improve function names and add comments to make it clearer what the self
> isolation model is, what the steps do, and why they happen at the points
> they happen.
> 
> Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
> ---
>  isolation.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
>  isolation.h |  6 ++--
>  passt.c     |  8 ++---
>  3 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/isolation.c b/isolation.c
> index 124dea4..10cef05 100644
> --- a/isolation.c
> +++ b/isolation.c
> @@ -12,6 +12,48 @@
>   * Author: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
>   * Author: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
>   */
> +/**
> + * DOC: Theory of Operation
> + *
> + * For security the passt/pasta process performs a number of
> + * self-isolations steps, dropping capabilities, setting namespaces
> + * and otherwise minimizing the impact we can have on the system at
> + * large if we were compromised.

I would try to be consistent with the BrE spelling we used everywhere
else: minimising, daemonising.

> + *
> + * Obviously we can't isolate ourselves from resources before we've
> + * done anything we need to do with those resources, so we have
> + * multiple stages of self-isolation.  In order these are:
> + *
> + * 1. isolate_initial()
> + * ====================
> + *
> + * Executed immediately after startup, drops capabilities we don't
> + * need at any point during execution (or which we gain back when we
> + * need by joining other namespaces).
> + *
> + * 2. isolate_user()
> + * =================
> + *
> + * Executed once we know what user and user namespace we want to
> + * operate in.  Sets our final UID & GID, and enters the correct user
> + * namespace.
> + *
> + * 3. isolate_prefork()
> + * ====================
> + *
> + * Executed after all setup, but before daemonizing (fork()ing into
> + * the background).  Uses mount namespace and pivot_root() to remove
> + * our access to the filesystem().

filesystem() is not a function I know about. :)

> + *
> + * 4. isolate_postfork()
> + * =====================
> + *
> + * Executed immediately after daemonizing, but before entering the
> + * actual packet forwarding phase of operation.  Or, if not
> + * daemonizing, immediately after isolate_prefork().  Uses seccomp()
> + * to restrict ourselves to the handful of syscalls we need during
> + * runtime operation.
> + */
>  
>  #include <errno.h>
>  #include <fcntl.h>
> @@ -47,7 +89,7 @@
>  /**
>   * drop_caps() - Drop capabilities we might have except for CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE
>   */
> -void drop_caps(void)
> +static void drop_caps(void)
>  {
>  	int i;
>  
> @@ -59,12 +101,31 @@ void drop_caps(void)
>  	}
>  }
>  
> +/**
> + * isolate_initial() - Early, config independent self isolation
> + *
> + * Should:
> + *  - drop unneeded capabilities
> + * Musn't:
> + *  - remove filessytem access (we need to access files during setup)
> + */
> +void isolate_initial(void)
> +{
> +	drop_caps();
> +}
> +
>  /**
>   * isolate_user() - Switch to final UID/GID and move into userns
>   * @uid:	User ID to run as (in original userns)
>   * @gid:	Group ID to run as (in original userns)
>   * @use_userns:	Whether to join or create a userns
>   * @userns:	userns path to enter, may be empty
> + *
> + * Should:
> + *  - set our final UID and GID
> + *  - enter our final user namespace
> + * Mustn't:
> + *  - remove filesystem access (we need that for further setup)
>   */
>  void isolate_user(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, bool use_userns, const char *userns)
>  {
> @@ -134,11 +195,19 @@ void isolate_user(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, bool use_userns, const char *userns)
>  }
>  
>  /**
> - * sandbox() - Unshare IPC, mount, PID, UTS, and user namespaces, "unmount" root
> + * isolate_prefork() - Self isolation before daemonizing
> + * @c:		Execution context
> + *

What does it return?

> + * Should:
> + *  - Moves us to our own IPC and UTS namespaces
> + *  - Moves us to a mount namespace with only an empty directory
> + *  - Drops unneeded capabilities (in the new user namespace)

- move us ...
- drop ...

now, this will not move us into a new PID namespace, so it's a bit
difficult to summarise in a very short form what it does with regard to
that, and the comment below is already descriptive enough -- unless you
can think of something.

> + * Mustn't:
> + *  - Remove syscalls we need to daemonize

"remove", "daemonise", for consistency.

>   *
>   * Return: negative error code on failure, zero on success
>   */
> -int sandbox(struct ctx *c)
> +int isolate_prefork(struct ctx *c)
>  {
>  	int flags = CLONE_NEWIPC | CLONE_NEWNS | CLONE_NEWUTS;
>  
> @@ -187,13 +256,19 @@ int sandbox(struct ctx *c)
>  }
>  
>  /**
> - * seccomp() - Set up seccomp filters depending on mode, won't return on failure
> + * isolate_postfork() - Self isolation after daemonizing
>   * @c:		Execution context
> + *
> + * Should:
> + *  - disable core dumps
> + *  - limit to a minimal set of syscalls
>   */
> -void seccomp(const struct ctx *c)
> +void isolate_postfork(const struct ctx *c)
>  {
>  	struct sock_fprog prog;
>  
> +	prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0);
> +
>  	if (c->mode == MODE_PASST) {
>  		prog.len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter_passt);
>  		prog.filter = filter_passt;
> diff --git a/isolation.h b/isolation.h
> index 2c73df7..70a38f9 100644
> --- a/isolation.h
> +++ b/isolation.h
> @@ -7,9 +7,9 @@
>  #ifndef ISOLATION_H
>  #define ISOLATION_H
>  
> -void drop_caps(void);
> +void isolate_initial(void);
>  void isolate_user(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, bool use_userns, const char *userns);
> -int sandbox(struct ctx *c);
> -void seccomp(const struct ctx *c);
> +int isolate_prefork(struct ctx *c);
> +void isolate_postfork(const struct ctx *c);
>  
>  #endif /* ISOLATION_H */
> diff --git a/passt.c b/passt.c
> index 2c4a986..46f80a0 100644
> --- a/passt.c
> +++ b/passt.c
> @@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
>  
>  	arch_avx2_exec(argv);
>  
> -	drop_caps();
> +	isolate_initial();
>  
>  	c.pasta_netns_fd = c.fd_tap = c.fd_tap_listen = -1;
>  
> @@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
>  		}
>  	}
>  
> -	if (sandbox(&c)) {
> +	if (isolate_prefork(&c)) {
>  		err("Failed to sandbox process, exiting\n");
>  		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
>  	}
> @@ -297,9 +297,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
>  	else
>  		write_pidfile(pidfile_fd, getpid());
>  
> -	prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0);
> -
> -	seccomp(&c);
> +	isolate_postfork(&c);
>  
>  	timer_init(&c, &now);
>  

-- 
Stefano


  reply	other threads:[~2022-10-13  2:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-10-11  5:40 [PATCH 00/10] Fixes and cleanups for capability handling David Gibson
2022-10-11  5:40 ` [PATCH 01/10] test: Move slower tests to end of test run David Gibson
2022-10-11  5:40 ` [PATCH 02/10] pasta: More general way of starting spawned shell as a login shell David Gibson
2022-10-13  2:16   ` Stefano Brivio
2022-10-13  8:22     ` David Gibson
2022-10-13  9:48       ` Stefano Brivio
2022-10-13 23:24         ` David Gibson
2022-10-11  5:40 ` [PATCH 03/10] pasta_start_ns() always ends in parent context David Gibson
2022-10-11  5:40 ` [PATCH 04/10] Remove unhelpful drop_caps() call in pasta_start_ns() David Gibson
2022-10-11  5:40 ` [PATCH 05/10] Clarify various self-isolation steps David Gibson
2022-10-13  2:17   ` Stefano Brivio [this message]
2022-10-13  8:31     ` David Gibson
2022-10-13 12:49   ` Stefano Brivio
2022-10-13 23:25     ` David Gibson
2022-10-11  5:40 ` [PATCH 06/10] Replace FWRITE with a function David Gibson
2022-10-13  2:17   ` Stefano Brivio
2022-10-13  8:51     ` David Gibson
2022-10-11  5:40 ` [PATCH 07/10] isolation: Replace drop_caps() with a version that actually does something David Gibson
2022-10-13  2:18   ` Stefano Brivio
2022-10-13  9:44     ` David Gibson
2022-10-13  4:01   ` Stefano Brivio
2022-10-13 13:08     ` Stefano Brivio
2022-10-13 16:37       ` Stefano Brivio
2022-10-13 23:42         ` David Gibson
2022-10-11  5:40 ` [PATCH 08/10] isolation: Prevent any child processes gaining capabilities David Gibson
2022-10-13  2:17   ` Stefano Brivio
2022-10-13  9:33     ` David Gibson
2022-10-13  9:50       ` Stefano Brivio
2022-10-11  5:40 ` [PATCH 09/10] isolation: Only configure UID/GID mappings in userns when spawning shell David Gibson
2022-10-13  2:18   ` Stefano Brivio
2022-10-13  9:36     ` David Gibson
2022-10-11  5:40 ` [PATCH 10/10] Rename pasta_setup_ns() to pasta_spawn_cmd() David Gibson
2022-10-13  2:44 ` [PATCH 00/10] Fixes and cleanups for capability handling Stefano Brivio

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