public inbox for passt-dev@passt.top
 help / color / mirror / code / Atom feed
From: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
To: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Cc: passt-dev@passt.top, Matej Hrica <mhrica@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] util, lineread, tap: Overflow checks on long signed sums and subtractions
Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2024 09:55:46 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240627095537.4d3f20f8@elisabeth> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Zny8qpnEENU0lh5g@zatzit>

On Thu, 27 Jun 2024 11:13:14 +1000
David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> wrote:

> On Thu, Jun 27, 2024 at 01:45:35AM +0200, Stefano Brivio wrote:
> > Potential sum and subtraction overflows were reported by Coverity in a
> > few places where we use size_t and ssize_t types.
> > 
> > Strictly speaking, those are not false positives even if I don't see a
> > way to trigger those: for instance, if we receive up to n bytes from a
> > socket up, the return value from recv() is already constrained and
> > can't overflow for the usage we make in tap_handler_passt().  
> 
> Actually, I think they are false positives.  In a bunch of cases the
> reasoning for that does rely on assuming the kernel will never return
> a value greater than the buffer size for read(), write() or similar.

No, that was exactly my point: return values are constrained by the
kernel, but a static checker doesn't necessarily have to assume a kernel
that's properly functioning.

In general, static checkers do, especially if POSIX has a clear
definition of a system call, and for what matters to us, they should.

But here Coverity is ignoring that, and I'm not sure we should call it
a false positive. It's kind of arbitrary really. I think Coverity in
these cases just prefers to "blindly" apply CERT C INT32-C locally,
which is not necessarily a bad choice, because "false positives" are
not so much of a nuisance.

> So possibly just ASSERT()ing that would suffice.

In some cases yes, but as we have built-ins in gcc and Clang that aim
at keeping the cost of the checks down by, quoting gcc documentation,
using "hardware instructions to implement these built-in functions where
possible", and they already implement the operation, open-coding our own
checks for assertions looks redundant and might result in slower code.

> > In any case, take care of those by adding two functions that
> > explicitly check for overflows in sums and subtractions of long signed
> > values, and using them.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
> > ---
> >  lineread.c |  5 +++--
> >  tap.c      | 21 +++++++++++++++------
> >  util.c     |  7 +++++--
> >  util.h     | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> >  4 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/lineread.c b/lineread.c
> > index 0387f4a..12f2d24 100644
> > --- a/lineread.c
> > +++ b/lineread.c
> > @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
> >  #include <string.h>
> >  #include <stdbool.h>
> >  #include <unistd.h>
> > +#include <errno.h>
> >  
> >  #include "lineread.h"
> >  #include "util.h"
> > @@ -102,8 +103,8 @@ ssize_t lineread_get(struct lineread *lr, char **line)
> >  
> >  		if (rc == 0)
> >  			eof = true;
> > -		else
> > -			lr->count += rc;  
> 
> From the construction of the read, lr->count + rc can never exceed
> LINEREAD_BUFFER_SIZE - lr->next_line, so this can't overflow.

Sure. But, especially as package maintainer, in this case I prefer to
have a useless check than carrying suppressions around.

> > +		else if (saddl_overflow(lr->count, rc, &lr->count))
> > +			return -ERANGE;
> >  	}
> >  
> >  	*line = lr->buf + lr->next_line;
> > diff --git a/tap.c b/tap.c
> > index ec994a2..7f8c26d 100644
> > --- a/tap.c
> > +++ b/tap.c
> > @@ -1031,7 +1031,11 @@ redo:
> >  		 */
> >  		if (l2len > n) {
> >  			rem = recv(c->fd_tap, p + n, l2len - n, 0);
> > -			if ((n += rem) != l2len)  
> 
> Similarly, rem <= l2len - n, and therefore n + rem <= l2len.

Same here.

> > +
> > +			if (saddl_overflow(n, rem, &n))
> > +				return;
> > +
> > +			if (n != l2len)
> >  				return;
> >  		}
> >  
> > @@ -1046,7 +1050,9 @@ redo:
> >  
> >  next:
> >  		p += l2len;
> > -		n -= l2len;  
> 
> We already checked that l2len <= n, so this one can't overflow either.

Same here.

> Not sure why Coverity can't see that itself, though :/.  Possibly it
> doesn't understand gotos well enough to see that the only goto next is
> after that check.

It sees that, that's the path it takes in reporting a potential
overflow here. I think here, again, it's just blindly requesting
INT32-C from CERT C rules, locally.

> > +
> > +		if (ssubl_overflow(n, l2len, &n))
> > +			return;
> >  	}
> >  
> >  	tap_handler(c, now);
> > @@ -1077,17 +1083,20 @@ redo:
> >  	tap_flush_pools();
> >  restart:
> >  	while ((len = read(c->fd_tap, pkt_buf + n, TAP_BUF_BYTES - n)) > 0) {
> > -
> >  		if (len < (ssize_t)sizeof(struct ethhdr) ||
> >  		    len > (ssize_t)ETH_MAX_MTU) {
> > -			n += len;  
> 
> Here n+len can't exceed TAP_BUF_BYTES, so again, no overflow.

Same here.

> > +			if (saddl_overflow(n, len, &n))
> > +				return;
> > +
> >  			continue;
> >  		}
> >  
> > -
> >  		tap_add_packet(c, len, pkt_buf + n);
> >  
> > -		if ((n += len) == TAP_BUF_BYTES)  
> 
> Same here.

Same here.

> > +		if (saddl_overflow(n, len, &n))
> > +			return;
> > +
> > +		if (n == TAP_BUF_BYTES)
> >  			break;
> >  	}
> >  
> > diff --git a/util.c b/util.c
> > index dd2e57f..a72d6c5 100644
> > --- a/util.c
> > +++ b/util.c
> > @@ -567,7 +567,7 @@ int do_clone(int (*fn)(void *), char *stack_area, size_t stack_size, int flags,
> >   *
> >   * #syscalls write writev
> >   */
> > -int write_remainder(int fd, const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt, size_t skip)
> > +int write_remainder(int fd, const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt, ssize_t skip)  
> 
> I don't love this change, since negative skip values make no sense.
>
> >  {
> >  	int i;
> >  	size_t offset;
> > @@ -585,7 +585,10 @@ int write_remainder(int fd, const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt, size_t skip)
> >  		if (rc < 0)
> >  			return -1;
> >  
> > -		skip += rc;  
> 
> Ok, here it's not a false positive.  I believe this really could
> overflow if you had an iov where the sum of the iov_len exceeded a
> size_t.
> 
> > +		if (saddl_overflow(skip, rc, &skip)) {
> > +			errno = -ERANGE;
> > +			return -1;
> > +		}  
> 
> If you leave skip an unsigned, you've already checked for negative rc,
> so this is essentially an unsigned add.  Checking for overflow on an
> unsigned addition is simpler than the logic of saddl_overflow().

I'm fairly sure I tried that and it looked rather bulky, because I
couldn't use __builtin_uaddl_overflow() if I recall correctly, I can try
again.

> >  	}
> >  
> >  	return 0;
> > diff --git a/util.h b/util.h
> > index eebb027..497d2fd 100644
> > --- a/util.h
> > +++ b/util.h
> > @@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ void pidfile_write(int fd, pid_t pid);
> >  int __daemon(int pidfile_fd, int devnull_fd);
> >  int fls(unsigned long x);
> >  int write_file(const char *path, const char *buf);
> > -int write_remainder(int fd, const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt, size_t skip);
> > +int write_remainder(int fd, const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt, ssize_t skip);
> >  
> >  /**
> >   * af_name() - Return name of an address family
> > @@ -223,6 +223,50 @@ static inline bool mod_between(unsigned x, unsigned i, unsigned j, unsigned m)
> >  	return mod_sub(x, i, m) < mod_sub(j, i, m);
> >  }
> >  
> > +/**
> > + * saddl_overflow() - Sum with overflow check for long signed values
> > + * @a:		First value
> > + * @b:		Second value
> > + * @sum:	Pointer to result of sum, if it doesn't overflow
> > + *
> > + * Return: true if the sum would overflow, false otherwise
> > + */
> > +static inline bool saddl_overflow(long a, long b, long *sum)  
> 
> These take long, but you're often calling them with ssize_t.  That's
> _probably_ the same thing, but not necessarily.

Right, yes, ssize_t can be long or int, even though I'm fairly sure it's
always long on all the architectures we are able to build for.

There's no integer overflow built-in for ssize_t, but I'll probably
need to add a macro conditional for the whole thing anyway, based on
the type of ssize_t.

> > +{
> > +#if __GNUC__
> > +	return __builtin_saddl_overflow(a, b, sum);
> > +#else
> > +	if ((a > 0 && a > LONG_MAX - b) ||
> > +	    (b < 0 && a < LONG_MIN - b))
> > +		return true;
> > +
> > +	*sum = a + b;
> > +	return false;
> > +#endif
> > +}
> > +
> > +/**
> > + * saddl_overflow() - Subtraction with overflow check for long signed values  
> 
> s/saddl_overflow/ssubl_overflow/

Oops, fixed.

> > + * @a:		Minuend
> > + * @b:		Subtrahend
> > + * @sum:	Pointer to result of subtraction, if it doesn't overflow
> > + *
> > + * Return: true if the subtraction would overflow, false otherwise
> > + */
> > +static inline bool ssubl_overflow(long a, long b, long *diff)
> > +{
> > +#if __GNUC__
> > +	return __builtin_ssubl_overflow(a, b, diff);
> > +#else
> > +	if ((b > 0 && a < LONG_MIN + b) ||
> > +	    (b < 0 && a > LONG_MAX + b))
> > +		return true;
> > +
> > +	*diff = a - b;
> > +	return false;
> > +#endif
> > +}
> > +
> >  /*
> >   * Workarounds for https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/58992
> >   *  
> 

-- 
Stefano


  reply	other threads:[~2024-06-27  7:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-06-26 23:45 [PATCH 0/4] Small, assorted "hardening" fixes Stefano Brivio
2024-06-26 23:45 ` [PATCH 1/4] conf: Copy up to MAXDNSRCH - 1 bytes, not MAXDNSRCH Stefano Brivio
2024-06-27  0:45   ` David Gibson
2024-06-27  7:27     ` Stefano Brivio
2024-06-27 10:11       ` David Gibson
2024-06-26 23:45 ` [PATCH 2/4] tcp_splice: Check return value of setsockopt() for SO_RCVLOWAT Stefano Brivio
2024-06-27  0:46   ` David Gibson
2024-06-26 23:45 ` [PATCH 3/4] util, lineread, tap: Overflow checks on long signed sums and subtractions Stefano Brivio
2024-06-27  1:13   ` David Gibson
2024-06-27  7:55     ` Stefano Brivio [this message]
2024-06-27 20:46       ` Stefano Brivio
2024-06-28  7:15         ` David Gibson
2024-06-28  7:11       ` David Gibson
2024-06-28  7:55         ` Stefano Brivio
2024-06-28 18:30           ` Stefano Brivio
2024-07-08 13:01             ` Stefano Brivio
2024-06-26 23:45 ` [PATCH 4/4] tap: Drop frames from guest whose length is more than remaining buffer Stefano Brivio
2024-06-27  1:30   ` David Gibson
2024-06-27  8:21     ` Stefano Brivio
2024-06-28  7:19       ` David Gibson
2024-06-28  7:56         ` Stefano Brivio

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20240627095537.4d3f20f8@elisabeth \
    --to=sbrivio@redhat.com \
    --cc=david@gibson.dropbear.id.au \
    --cc=mhrica@redhat.com \
    --cc=passt-dev@passt.top \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
Code repositories for project(s) associated with this public inbox

	https://passt.top/passt

This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for IMAP folder(s).