From: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
To: Richard Lawrence <rlawrence@tamu.edu>
Cc: passt-dev@passt.top
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] pasta: Add --pass-fds option to skip closing file descriptors
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2026 08:03:35 +0100 (CET) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261111080334.17920495@elisabeth> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261104202019.452348-1-rlawrence@tamu.edu>
On Wed, 4 Nov 2026 14:20:19 -0600
Richard Lawrence <rlawrence@tamu.edu> wrote:
> When pasta spawns a command (`pasta [options] -- [command]`), all open file
> descriptors inherited from the parent process except standard streams (0-2)
> and the tap descriptor (`--fd`) are normally closed by `isolate_fds()`.
>
> However, when pasta is used for testing, development, or launching tools like
> Bubblewrap (`bwrap`), the spawned command may require file descriptors
> passed directly from the parent process. In this case, closing inherited file
> descriptors breaks expected behavior.
>
> Add a boolean `--pass-fds` flag for pasta mode that skips the `close_range()`
> cleanup step in `isolate_fds()`, leaving all open file descriptors intact
> for the child command.
>
> Summary of changes:
>
> - Update `conf_tap_fd()` to `conf_fds()`, allowing early parsing of both
> `-F`/`--fd` and `--pass-fds` before main option processing.
> - Update `isolate_fds()` to check `c->pass_fds`: if set, skip calling
> `close_range()` while still relocating the tap fd out of standard stream
> range (0-2) if needed.
> - Enforce validation in `conf()` ensuring `--pass-fds` is restricted to pasta
> mode when spawning a command (incompatible with attaching to an
> existing netns).
> - Update man page and usage help output.
>
> Link: https://bugs.passt.top/show_bug.cgi?id=204
> Signed-off-by: Richard Lawrence <rlawrence@tamu.edu>
Applied, sorry it took so long.
Thanks for sticking to this, and welcome to the git log!
By the way, I took the liberty to fix a couple of minor coding style
issues on merge:
> ---
> conf.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
> conf.h | 2 +-
> isolation.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
> isolation.h | 2 +-
> passt.1 | 5 ++++
> passt.c | 2 +-
> passt.h | 2 ++
> 7 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/conf.c b/conf.c
> index 149a4c7..9f7eafb 100644
> --- a/conf.c
> +++ b/conf.c
> @@ -750,7 +750,8 @@ pasta_opts:
> " Don't copy all addresses to namespace\n"
> " --ns-mac-addr ADDR Set MAC address on tap interface\n"
> " --no-splice Disable inbound socket splicing\n"
> - " --splice-only Only enable loopback forwarding\n");
> + " --splice-only Only enable loopback forwarding\n"
> + " --pass-fds Preserve open file descriptors\n");
>
> passt_exit(status);
> }
> @@ -1137,35 +1138,38 @@ static void conf_sock_listen(const struct ctx *c)
> }
>
> /**
> - * conf_tap_fd() - Read tap fd as supplied by -F command line option
> + * conf_fds() - Read fds as supplied by -F/--fd and --pass-fds options
> + * @c: Execution context
> * @argc: Argument count
> * @argv: Command line options
> - *
> - * Return: fd number from --fd option, or -1 if not supplied
> */
> -int conf_tap_fd(int argc, char **argv)
> +void conf_fds(struct ctx *c, int argc, char **argv)
> {
> - const struct option optfd[] = { { "fd", required_argument, NULL, 'F' },
> - { 0 }, };
> - const char *fdarg = NULL, *p;
> - unsigned long val;
> + const struct option opt[] = {
> + { "fd", required_argument, NULL, 'F' },
> + { "pass-fds", no_argument, NULL, 2 },
> + { 0 },
> + };
> int name;
>
> + c->fd_tap = -1;
> + c->pass_fds = false;
> optind = 0;
> do {
> - name = getopt_long(argc, argv, "-:F:", optfd, NULL);
> - if (name == 'F')
> - fdarg = optarg;
> - } while (name != -1);
> -
> - if (!fdarg)
> - return -1;
> + name = getopt_long(argc, argv, "-:F:", opt, NULL);
> + if (name == 'F') {
> + const char *p = optarg;
> + unsigned long val;
>
> - p = fdarg;
> - if (!parse_unsigned(&p, 0, &val) || !parse_eoi(p) || val > INT_MAX)
> - die("Invalid --fd: %s", fdarg);
> + if (!parse_unsigned(&p, 0, &val) || !parse_eoi(p) ||
> + val > INT_MAX)
> + die("Invalid --fd: %s", optarg);
>
> - return val;
> + c->fd_tap = (int)val;
> + } else if (name == 2) {
> + c->pass_fds = true;
> + }
> + } while (name != -1);
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -1317,6 +1321,7 @@ void conf(struct ctx *c, int argc, char **argv)
> {"conf-path", required_argument, NULL, 'c' },
> {"chroot-fallback", no_argument, NULL, 32 },
> {"no-pidns", no_argument, NULL, 33 },
> + {"pass-fds", no_argument, NULL, 34 },
> { 0 },
> };
> const char *optstring = "+dqfel:hs:c:F:I:p:P:m:a:n:M:g:i:o:D:S:H:461t:u:T:U:";
> @@ -1567,6 +1572,11 @@ void conf(struct ctx *c, int argc, char **argv)
>
> c->no_pidns = true;
> break;
> + case 34:
> + /* --pass-fds was parsed early */
> + if (c->mode != MODE_PASTA)
> + die("--pass-fds is for pasta mode only");
> + break;
> case 'd':
> c->debug = 1;
> c->quiet = 0;
> @@ -1603,7 +1613,7 @@ void conf(struct ctx *c, int argc, char **argv)
> c->fd_control_listen = c->fd_control = -1;
> break;
> case 'F':
> - /* --fd was parsed early and c->fd_tap set in main() */
> + /* --fd was parsed early */
> c->one_off = true;
> *c->sock_path = 0;
> break;
> @@ -1929,6 +1939,9 @@ void conf(struct ctx *c, int argc, char **argv)
> else if (optind != argc)
> die("Extra non-option argument: %s", argv[optind]);
>
> + if (c->pass_fds && *netns)
> + die("--pass-fds can only be used when spawning a command");
> +
> if (c->no_pidns && *netns)
> die("--no-pidns is incompatible with PID or --netns");
>
> diff --git a/conf.h b/conf.h
> index 19bf9bc..654fd16 100644
> --- a/conf.h
> +++ b/conf.h
> @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
> #define CONF_H
>
> enum passt_modes conf_mode(int argc, char *argv[]);
> -int conf_tap_fd(int argc, char **argv);
> +void conf_fds(struct ctx *c, int argc, char **argv);
> void conf(struct ctx *c, int argc, char **argv);
> void conf_listen_handler(struct ctx *c, uint32_t events);
> void conf_handler(struct ctx *c, uint32_t events);
> diff --git a/isolation.c b/isolation.c
> index a00475f..1875e6b 100644
> --- a/isolation.c
> +++ b/isolation.c
> @@ -250,46 +250,57 @@ void isolate_initial(void)
> }
>
> /*
> - * isolate_fds() - Close leaked files, but not --fd, stdin, stdout, stderr
> + * isolate_fds() - Close leaked files if applicable
> + * @c: Execution context
> * @argc: Argument count
> - * @argv: Command line options, as we need to skip any file given via --fd
> + * @argv: Command line options
> *
> * Should:
> - * - close all open files except for standard streams and the one from --fd
> + * - close all open files except for standard streams and the one from --fd,
> + unless --pass-fds is used, in which case all fds are preserved
a missing * here,
> * - move the --fd descriptor out of the range 0-2
> - *
> - * Return: new fd number for descriptor from --fd, or -1 if not specified
> + * - update the execution context
> */
> -int isolate_fds(int argc, char **argv)
> +void isolate_fds(struct ctx *c, int argc, char **argv)
> {
> - int fd, close_from = STDERR_FILENO + 1;
> + conf_fds(c, argc, argv);
>
> - fd = conf_tap_fd(argc, argv);
> + if (c->pass_fds) {
> + if (c->fd_tap >= 0 && c->fd_tap < STDERR_FILENO + 1) {
> + /* Move the tap fd to a safer location */
> + int new_fd = fcntl(c->fd_tap, F_DUPFD, STDERR_FILENO + 1);
line wrapping here,
>
> - if (fd >= 0) {
> - /* Move the passed fd to a more convenient location */
> - if (fd != close_from &&
> - (dup2(fd, close_from) != close_from ||
> - close(fd)))
> - die_perror("Could not move --fd descriptor");
> - fd = close_from++;
> - }
> + if (new_fd < 0 || close(c->fd_tap))
> + die_perror("Could not relocate --fd descriptor");
and here,
> + c->fd_tap = new_fd;
> + }
> + } else {
> + int close_from = STDERR_FILENO + 1;
> +
> + if (c->fd_tap >= 0) {
> + /* Move the tap fd to a more convenient location */
> + if (c->fd_tap != close_from &&
> + (dup2(c->fd_tap, close_from) != close_from ||
> + close(c->fd_tap)))
vertical alignment here,
> + die_perror("Could not move --fd descriptor");
> + c->fd_tap = close_from++;
> + }
>
> - if (close_range(close_from, ~0U, CLOSE_RANGE_UNSHARE)) {
> - if (errno == ENOSYS || errno == EINVAL) {
> - /* This probably means close_range() or the
> - * CLOSE_RANGE_UNSHARE flag is not supported by the
> - * kernel. Not much we can do here except carry on and
> - * hope for the best.
> - */
> - warn(
> -"Can't use close_range() to ensure no files leaked by parent");
> - } else {
> - die_perror("Failed to close files leaked by parent");
> + /* Close leaked file descriptors */
> + if (close_range(close_from, ~0U, CLOSE_RANGE_UNSHARE)) {
> + if (errno == ENOSYS || errno == EINVAL) {
> + /* This probably means close_range() or the
> + * CLOSE_RANGE_UNSHARE flag is not supported by the
> + * kernel. Not much we can do here except carry on and
> + * hope for the best.
line wrapping here,
> + */
> + warn(
> + "Can't use close_range() to ensure no files leaked by parent");
and this, which was supposed to be at the beginning of the line.
> + } else {
> + die_perror("Failed to close files leaked by parent");
> + }
> }
> }
> -
> - return fd;
> }
>
> /**
--
Stefano
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-11 7:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-04 20:20 Richard Lawrence
2026-11-11 7:03 ` Stefano Brivio [this message]
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