Re: [PATCH] tcp: Explicitly check option length field values in tcp_opt_get()

[David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>]

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On Wed, Jan 04, 2023 at 06:44:21PM +0100, Stefano Brivio wrote:
> Reported by Coverity (CWE-606, Untrusted loop bound), and actually
> harmless because we'll exit the option-scanning loop if the remaining
> length is not enough for a new option, instead of reading past the
> header.
> 
> In any case, it looks like a good idea to explicitly check for
> reasonable values of option lengths.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>

Reviewed-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>

> ---
>  tcp.c | 4 ++++
>  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/tcp.c b/tcp.c
> index 26037b3..1e0a338 100644
> --- a/tcp.c
> +++ b/tcp.c
> @@ -1117,6 +1117,10 @@ static int tcp_opt_get(const char *opts, size_t len, uint8_t type_find,
>  			break;
>  		default:
>  			type = *(opts++);
> +
> +			if (*(uint8_t *)opts < 2 || *(uint8_t *)opts > len)
> +				return -1;
> +
>  			optlen = *(opts++) - 2;
>  			len -= 2;
>  

-- 
David Gibson			| I'll have my music baroque, and my code
david AT gibson.dropbear.id.au	| minimalist, thank you.  NOT _the_ _other_
				| _way_ _around_!
http://www.ozlabs.org/~dgibson

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