On Tue, Aug 06, 2024 at 08:38:37PM +0200, Stefano Brivio wrote: > If a parent accidentally or due to implementation reasons leaks any > open file, we don't want to have access to them, except for the file > passed via --fd, if any. > > This is the case for Podman when Podman's parent leaks files into > Podman: it's not practical for Podman to close unrelated files before > starting pasta, as reported by Paul. > > Use close_range(2) to close all open files except for standard streams > and the one from --fd. > > Given that parts of conf() depend on other files to be already opened, > such as the epoll file descriptor, we can't easily defer this to a > more convenient point, where --fd was already parsed. Introduce a > minimal, duplicate version of --fd parsing to keep this simple. > > Suggested-by: Paul Holzinger > Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio > --- > conf.c | 1 + > passt.c | 2 ++ > util.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > util.h | 1 + > 4 files changed, 40 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/conf.c b/conf.c > index 14d8ece..89f5b3d 100644 > --- a/conf.c > +++ b/conf.c > @@ -1260,6 +1260,7 @@ void conf(struct ctx *c, int argc, char **argv) > c->tcp.fwd_in.mode = c->tcp.fwd_out.mode = FWD_UNSET; > c->udp.fwd_in.mode = c->udp.fwd_out.mode = FWD_UNSET; > > + optind = 1; > do { > name = getopt_long(argc, argv, optstring, options, NULL); > > diff --git a/passt.c b/passt.c > index ea5bece..be7e84a 100644 > --- a/passt.c > +++ b/passt.c > @@ -211,6 +211,8 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) > > arch_avx2_exec(argv); > > + close_open_files(argc, argv); Any reason not to fold this logic into isolate_initial()? Seems like it is part of self-isolation handling. Also, I think this could wait until after the existing isolate_initial() logic. Dropping caps before examining the command line seems like a sensible precaution. > isolate_initial(); > > c.pasta_netns_fd = c.fd_tap = c.pidfile_fd = -1; > diff --git a/util.c b/util.c > index 54a9f58..ca627c6 100644 > --- a/util.c > +++ b/util.c > @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include > > #include "util.h" > #include "iov.h" > @@ -694,3 +695,38 @@ const char *str_ee_origin(const struct sock_extended_err *ee) > > return ""; > } > + > +/** > + * close_open_files() - Close leaked files, but not --fd, stdin, stdout, stderr > + * @argc: Argument count > + * @argv: Command line options, as we need to skip any file given via --fd > + */ > +void close_open_files(int argc, char **argv) > +{ > + const struct option optfd[] = { { "fd", required_argument, NULL, 'F' }, > + { 0 }, > + }; > + long fd = -1; > + int name; > + > + do { > + name = getopt_long(argc, argv, ":F", optfd, NULL); > + > + if (name == 'F') { > + errno = 0; > + fd = strtol(optarg, NULL, 0); > + > + if (fd < 0 || errno) > + die("Invalid --fd: %s", optarg); > + } > + } while (name != -1); > + > + if (fd == -1) { > + if (close_range(3, ~0U, CLOSE_RANGE_UNSHARE)) It's weird that close_range() takes unsigneds, although fds are near-universally signed ints. > + die_perror("Failed to close files leaked by parent"); > + } else { > + if (close_range(3, fd - 1, CLOSE_RANGE_UNSHARE) || > + close_range(fd + 1, ~0U, CLOSE_RANGE_UNSHARE)) > + die_perror("Failed to close files leaked by parent"); > + } > +} > diff --git a/util.h b/util.h > index e8bf957..ab11ee7 100644 > --- a/util.h > +++ b/util.h > @@ -183,6 +183,7 @@ int __daemon(int pidfile_fd, int devnull_fd); > int fls(unsigned long x); > int write_file(const char *path, const char *buf); > int write_remainder(int fd, const struct iovec *iov, size_t iovcnt, size_t skip); > +void close_open_files(int argc, char **argv); > > /** > * af_name() - Return name of an address family -- David Gibson (he or they) | I'll have my music baroque, and my code david AT gibson.dropbear.id.au | minimalist, thank you, not the other way | around. http://www.ozlabs.org/~dgibson